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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Governor of the State of Utah issued a policy 
prohibiting employees in the Division of Wildlife Resources 
(DWR), from participating in annual computer drawings for 
once-in-a-lifetime hunting permits. The appellants, 
representing employees in DWR, brought an action in Third 
District Court seeking injunctive relief against the policy 
and declaratory judgement relief declaring the policy un-
constitutional. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court granted a motion for summary 
judgement to the respondents. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellants seek a decision of this court reversing 
the summary judgement entered by the lower court and an 
Order declaring the policy issued by the respondents un-
constitutional and permanently enjoining the resoondents 
from enforcing the same. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Each year the Division of Wildlife Resources of the 
State of Utah conducts a special computer drawing for once-
in-a- lifetime hunting permits. The drawing covers the 
Buffalo hunt for which 20 resident permits are awarded; 
the Big Horn Sheep hunt for which 20 resident permits 
are awarded; and the Moose hunt for which 90 resident 
permits are awarded. Residents of the State of Utah may 
submit applications and if successful in the drawing, 
receive a hunting permit. The permit may only be obtained 
once in a lifetime, whether the hunter is successful in 
harvesting the animal or not. Thus the name "once-in-a-
lifetime" hunting permit. 
-2-
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On November 7, 1978, the governor issued a policy 
statement prohibiting personnel from the DWR, members of 
the Board of Big Game Control and the Director of the 
Department of Natural Resources from submitting applications 
for the annual drawings. His stated reason for issuing the 
policy was to "clear up any misunderstanding that may arise 
about the propriety of Wildlife personnel participating in 
a drawing of this kind." 
Though the policy statement did not say so, apparently 
the governor believed that a disproportionately high number 
of DWR personnel had been successful in obtaining hunting 
permits in the draw. However, notwithstanding the governor's 
belief, the facts show that only one DWR employee received 
a permit in 1977, and three DWR employees received permits 
in 1978 (Affidavit No. 5). Furthermore, the governor's 
policy statement and the pleadings filed herein specifically 
admit that absolutely no evidence of impropriety or wrong-
doing exists on the part of DWR personnel or anyone else 
connected with the drawings. 
Finally, affidavits on file herein show that Utah is 
the only state among the Rocky Mountain States which has 
a policy prohibiting its public employees from participating 
in the drawings (Affidavit tlo. 6), and at least three less 
burdensome alternative approaches are available which would 
- 3-
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allow the state to accomplish the purpose of the policy. 
These alternative approaches are: (1) to contract out the 
drawing to an independent third party computer firm 
(Affidavits No. 1 and 2); (2) to partially contract out 
the drawing by having it conducted and overseen by an 
independent third party (Affidavit No. 3); and (3) to 
limit the restriction against participating in the drawing 
to only the six DWR employees who are actually involved in 
conducting the drawing instead of all 350 DWR employees 
(Affidavit No. 4). 
POINT I 
THE POLICY VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION 
BECAUSE THERE ARE SEVERAL LESS BURDEN-
SOME ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO ACCOMPLISH 
THE SAi'1E PURPOSE. 
The appellants submit that the policy promulgated 
by the governor violates equal protection because there 
are several less burdensome alternatives available to 
accomplish the same purpose. 
A three-step test for determining the validity of 
a law or policy restricting fundamental constitutional 
rights was enunciated by the California Supreme Court 
in Bagley v. Washington Township Hospital District, 421 
P.2d 409 (1966), a case which held unconstitutional a 
statute prohibiting public employees from taking an active 
part in any political campaign. The court said at page 411 
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"A governmental agency which would 
require a waiver of constitutional rights 
as a condition of public employment bears 
the burden of showing the practical necessity 
for the limitation, and that it must demon-
strate, (1) that the political restraints 
rationally relate to the enhancement of 
public service, (2) that the benefits which 
the public gains by the restraints outweigh 
the resulting impairment of constitutional 
rights, and (3) that no alternatives less 
subversive of constitutional rights are 
available. (emphasis added). 
A subsequent California case, City of Carmel-By-
The-Sea v. Young, 466 P.2d 225 (1970), held unconstitutional 
a statute requiring financial disclosure by public officials 
on the grounds that less burdensome alternatives existed to 
accomplish the purpose of the statute. The court said at 
page 228: 
"The familiar rule is that a "govern-
mental purpose to control or prevent ac-
tivities constitutionally subject to state 
regulation may not be achieved by means 
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and 
thereby invade the area of protected free-
doms." (NAACP v. Alabama (1964) 377 
U.S. 288, 307, 84 S.Ct. 1302, 1314, 12 
L.Ed. 2d 325; Griswold v. State of Connecticut 
(1965) 381 U.S. 479, 485, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 
1682, 14 L.Ed.2d 510.) "[Elven though 
the governmental purpose be legitimate and 
substantial, that purpose cannot be pur-
sued by means that broadly stifle funda-
mental personal liberties when the end can 
be more narrowly achieved." (Shelton v. 
Tucker (1960) 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 
247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231.) "Precision of. 
regulation is required so that the exercise 
of our most precious freedoms will not be 
-5-
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unduly curtailed except to the extent 
necessitated by the legitimate govern-
mental objective. [Citations. J" (Vogel 
v. County of Los Angelos (1967) 68 Cal.2d 
18, 22, 64 Cal. Rptr. 409, 411, 434, 
P.2d 961, 963.) 
The court in City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, supra, stated 
further at page 232: 
"[W]here fundamental personal liberties 
are involved, they may not be abridged by 
the States simply on a showing that a 
regulatory statute has some rational rela-
tionship to the effectuation of a proper 
state purpose. 'Where there is a sig-
nificant encroachment upon personal liberty, 
the State may prevail only upon showing a 
subordinating interest which is compelling.' 
[Citation.] The law must be shown 'neces-
sary, and not merely rationally related to, 
the accomplishment of a permissible state 
policy.' [Citations. J" (Griswold v. State 
of Connecticut, 6u.ptta., 381 U.S. 479, 497, 
85 S. Ct. 16 78, 1689). "The breadth of 
legislative abridgement must be viewed in 
the light of less drastic means for 
achieving the same basic purpose." (Sheldon 
v. Tucker, 6u.p'tt1, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 
S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231.) 
Fort v. Civil Service Commission, 392 P.2d 385 (1964), 
involved a civil service employee who was dismissed for 
violating a county charter provision restricting the political 
activity of county employees. In holding the charter pro-
vision unconstitutional for being overly broad, the court 
said the following at page 389: 
-6-
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"It would plainly be incumbent upon 
the state to demonstrate that no alternative 
forms of regulation would combat the asserted 
abuses without infringing on First Amendment 
rights." 
Another case supportive of the proposition that a 
policy restricting fundamental rights cannot stand if there 
is a less restrictive alternative available to accomplish the 
same policy, is ::fancuso v. Taft, 341 F.Supp. 574 (1972). 
There the court said in declaring unconstitutional a city 
charter provision restricting political activity rights: 
"A regulation is invalid when there 
are less drastic means by which a statute 
restricting First Amendment rights could 
achieve its legitimate goal." 
In the instant case, there are affidavits on file which 
show the existence of at least three approaches which are 
less burdensome on the fundamental right of the DWR employees 
to participate in the drawing and to hunt, while still 
allowing the accomplishITJ.ent of the purpose for which the 
policy 1-1as implemented. 
The first alternative, as set forth in affidavits 
no. 1 and 2, involves contracting out the entire drawing 
process to an independent third party. This would totally 
remove all DWR employees from the drawing process. 
The second alternative, as set forth in affidavit 
no 3. involves partiallv contracting out the drawing 
;:n:-ocess to an independent third part:r with the computer 
- 7-
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service and non-consequential support services being provided 
by DWR personnel as necessary. This independent third party 
could be an elected official, any civic minded individual 
selected by the governor, or indeed the governor himself. 
This approach would result in no expenditure of funds by the 
state. 
The third alternative, as set forth in affidavit no. 4, 
involves limiting the prohibition to only those few DWR 
employees who are actually involved in the drawing process. 
Currently, the process is completely handled by eight DWR 
employees, and could conceivable be handled by six employees. 
Therefore, it makes little sense to prohibit all 350 DWR 
employees from participating in the drawing, when the 
prohibition could be limited to those employees actually 
involved in conducting the drawing. This third alternative 
is not totally acceptable to the appellants for obvious 
reasons, but is suggested simply because they find it less 
repugnant than a total prohibition. The six employees would 
have to be volunteers who simply elect not to hunt. 
In the instant case it is clear that the right to 
participate in the annual computer drawing for once-in-a-
lifetime hunting permits, and to engage in the hunt itself 
should they be successful in the drawing, is a fundamental 
right to DWR personnel. To say that hunting is a major 
-8-
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part of a DWR employee's life is a great understatement. 
Indeed, it is because of their love for hunting and out-
door recreation that most personnel in the DWR are employed 
in that agency. DWR personnel are the core of the hunting 
fraternity in the State of Utah, and to arbitrarily restrict 
their participation in that hunting fraternity is to deny 
them their First Amendment Right of Freedom of Association. 
To arbitrarily restrict their right to hunt and thereby 
restrict their right to harvest game to sustain themselves 
and their families, is to deprive them of property without 
Due Process of law. There is no justifiable reason to deny 
DWR employees, who are taxpayers of the state, access to 
the same program which is available to all other residents 
of the state. To do so is to violate the Equal Protection 
rights of the DI.JR employees. 
This arbitrary prohibition is particularly repugnant 
in view of the fact that it is totally unnecessary. As 
set forth above, there are at least three alternatives 
available to the governor which would accomplish the same 
purpose without violating the rights of DWR employees. 
These alternative approaches should be utilized before 
infringing upon the above-mentioned fundamental rights of 
DI.JR personnel. 
-9-
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 
IN VIEW OF THE COURT'S ADMISSION THAT MATERIAL 
FACTS WERE IN DISPUTE. 
The law is clear that summary judgement cannot be 
granted when material facts are in dispute. Rule 56(c), 
U.R.C.P. states: 
"Motion and Proceedings thereon. The 
motion shall be served at least 10 davs before 
the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse 
party prior to the day of hearing mav serve 
opposing affidavits. The judgement sought shall 
be rendered forthwith if the oleadin s, de ositions, 
answers to interrogatories, an admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no enuine issue as to an material 
act and that the movin artv is entitled to a 
judgement as a matter o law. A summary judgement, 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on 
the issue of liability alone although there is 
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages." 
(emphasis added). 
Following that rule, the Utah Supreme Court in Hatch v. 
Sugarhouse Finance Company, 434 P.2d 758 (1967), and Burnham 
v. Bankers Life & Casualtv Company, 470 P.2d 261 (1970) held 
sunnnary judgements granted by lower courts inappropriate be-
cause material issues of fact remained in dispute. 
In the instant case, the lower court issued a memorandum 
decision granting the respondent's motion for summary judgement 
In that memorandum decision, the lower court stated 
- 10-
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Based on the assertions of counsel that 
there are no questions of fact but only 
questions of law, the court finds that the 
policy statement issued by the Governor was 
within the constitutional powers of the office 
and gives summary judgement to the Defendant. 
However, the court wishes to note that the 
Plaintiff has alleged that the Governor's 
policy is too stringent and that the same 
thing can be accomplished in a "less burden-
some and restrictive" way, and this may 
be so. Affadavits are provided that assert 
alternative methods of solving this problem 
but in the court's opinion they raise 
uestions of fact which the court cannot con-
si er on a motion or summary judgement. 
The court feels that the only wav to 
resolve the uestion on whether there is a 
ess ur ensome an restrictive wa is at an 
evi entiary hearing. 
In short, the lower court granted the respondent's 
motion for summary judgement notwithstanding the admission 
that there existed disputed issues of material fact. For 
that reason the lower court's decision was in error. 
However, the appellants are not interested in "winning 
the battle only to lose the war." Therefore, unless this 
court agrees with the argument of the appellants in POINT I, 
the appellants are not interested in having the case remanded 
back to the lower court for the evidentiary hearing referred 
to in the 101-1er court's memorandum decision. 
-11-
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CONCLUSION 
The policy promulgated by the governor violates equal 
protection because there are several less burdensome 
al~ernatives available to accomplish the same purpose. 
These alternative approaches should be utilized before 
unnecessarily infringing upon the fundamental rights of 
DWR personnel. 
DATED this 10th day of October, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
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